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Introduction 
There has been much discussion on the issue of whether financial crisis are caused 
by external factors or internal factors. In this context, internal factors in economic 
crisis refer to the financial structure of a country, lack of monetary policy and so 
on. In addition, it has to be noted that these internal factors can be controlled and 
altered by the government of the country. In contrast, external factors represent to 
macroeconomic matters throughout the world, which cannot be controlled by the 
government of the country. In the case of Turkey, on the February 19, 2001, the 
Turkey economy was hit by massive financial crisis. In that time, overnight interest 
rates of the Central Bank of Turkey (CB) skyrocketed to 4059 percent in few days 
(Table 8), CB lost 7,5 billion dollars of reserves and the dollar exchange rate 
jumped from 685 thousand liras to 958 thousand liras (Fatih and Guven 2002). 
Therefore, the balance of Turkey economy was devastated and these conditions led 
the Turkey financial system to bankruptcy. Peter (2001) claimed that this crisis was 
the bankruptcy of the Turkey economy. Hence, it could be possible to state that it 
was the biggest financial crisis had been recorded in the Turkey economy history. 
Some economist blamed the Turkish financial crisis in 2001 was caused by the 
unfavourable changing in the world economy during the crisis period (Emre, 
2001). According to Emre (2001), these external factors, which triggered the crisis, 
were: “the rise of the interest rates in the United States by 100 basis points, the 
increase in the international energy prices and the loss in the relative strength of the 
Euro vis-à-vis the US $”. In addition, it can be added that the Russian economic 
crisis effects on the Turkey economy as an external factor (Ersan and Kenan, 
1999), while other economist argue that the Turkish economy was overwhelmingly 
affected by internal factors (Emre, 2001). These internal factors behind the crisis 
namely dis-inflation programme, which was initiated in December 1999 backed 
and supervised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), deficiencies and effects 
on the fragile banking system and financial environment, lack of fiscal discipline 
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and monetary policy, also ruling out of structural reforms such as privatization, and 
seasonal factors, wrong monetary policy to finance the current account deficit and 
political crisis as a last shot (Emre,2001, Emre, Hakan and Kamuran, 2001, Ahmet 
and Erinc, 2002, Fatih and Guven, 2002). This essay argues that this crisis was 
overwhelmingly caused by internal factors because it could possible to eliminate 
the external factors effects on the economy with implementing right monetary and 
it could also possible that if a country’s financial system is strong enough, it could 
protect itself from external attacks. However, some external factors also had an 
impact. In order to, demonstrate that this essay will first focus on the external 
factors behind the 2001 Turkish financial crisis. Having done that in the context of 
Turkey right before the crisis, the internal triggering factors will be presented. 
Moreover, this essay will endeavour to make contrast both of them with last global 
economic crisis effects, which boomed in the USA in the year 2008. 
 
 
Role of External Factors 
External factorsbehind the 2001 Turkish financial crisis can be examined under 
four main headings. 
First, it is obvious that the USA economy is one of the most powerful economies in 
the world. Thus, other economies throughout the world are affected by tiniest 
variation in the USA economic indicators. One of them is the gradual interest rate 
(the federal interest rate). It refers to overnight borrowing by banks to maintain 
their bank reserves in the United States of America (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 2007).  This is an important development because, Eichengreen and Rose 
(1998) point out that highly significant coefficient between changes in industrial-
country such as America, interest rates and liquidity crisis in emerging market. 
Therefore this indicator should be monitored to determine monetary policy makers 
in order to avoid its bad effects on the economy by the economic policy makers. In 
the case of Turkey, during the year before the 2001 liquidity crisis, this rate was 
increased 125 basis point s (from 4,97% to 6,24% ) (Figure 1) so as to relieve the 
US economy by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(Emre,2001). Meanwhile the Turkish overnight interest rates was affected 
negatively and continued to go up due to this situation. It was dramatically 
increased from 45, 6% to 62, 5. (Figure 2) As a result, it damaged the Turkish 
economy and triggered the 2001 economic crisis. This clearly shows that external 
factors are therefore relevant the 2001 crisis. 
 
However, it can be argued that this external factor was not a big player behind the 
crisis. Because, in contrast, before the 2008 global financial crisis, which was 
considered to be the worst economic crisis worldwide since “the great depression”. 
There was a considerable fluctuation in the FED Funds rates. For example, it was 
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decreased from 6.24% to 1.13% between 2002 and 2004. (Figure 1) Nevertheless, 
after that it was went up sharply and reached to 5.02% just before the global 
financial crisis. In this context, the Central Bank of Turkey could achieve to keep 
the recovery policies, which included financial and banking sector’s reforms, after 
the 2001 crisis period. Thus, at the same period, the overnight interest rate of 
Turkey was declined from 62, 50% to 15, 75% apart from small rise at the 
beginning of 2006 (Figure 2). Consequently, it is clear that FED Funds rates effects 
could be reduced by keeping the monetary policy. Therefore, it could be possible to 
state that external factors are not the relevant because their effects can be 
eliminated. 
 
Secondly, it could be claimed that there was a significant link between rise in crude 
oil prices and the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey. Emre (2001) has drawn attention 
to the fact that in the case of Turkey, “crude oil is the most important imported 
input for production and consumption”. It is clear that trade deficit, which refers to 
the amount by that merchandise imports exceed merchandise exports, could be 
affected negatively by this variation in crude oil prices. In this case, crude oil prices 
raised from US$ 17,8 to US$ 35 in 2000 (Figure 1). Thus, this exacerbated the 
problem of the trade deficit of Turkey (Table 2). In addition, the current account 
balance was affected negatively as well (Table 4). Because, the fact that the current 
account balance in the Turkey economy is mostly affected by changing energy 
prices (CB, Bulletin, 2009). Hence, this balance was devastated by this rise. As a 
result, it prepared a convenient ground for the liquidity crisis in 2001. Therefore, 
this clearly shows that there is an important relationship between the crisis and 
external factors. 
 
On the other hand, in order to see the role of rising crude oil prices on the Turkish 
economy as a triggering factor, ten-year period after the 2001 financial crisis 
should be analyzed. There was a dramatic increase in crude oil price between early 
2003 and 2007, and it reached the peak at almost $100 (Figure 1). It is true that it 
affected the balance of foreign trade and either trade deficit or the current account 
deficit soared. However, the Turkish economy could keep the sustainable growth 
and also could reduce the effects of this augmentation because, monetary policy 
makers changed the financing the current account system (CB, Bulletin, 2007). In 
2001, it was based on short- term capital which is so vulnerable. After that the 
government started to finance this deficit with long-term capital and direct 
investment (Figure 2). Therefore, it is clear that rise in crude oil price’s effects 
would be reduced. This clearly shows that external factors are therefore not the 
most relevant. 
 
External and Internal Factors of the Turkish Crisis in the Year 2001 Analysis Proposal 21 
 
 
Thirdly, unfavourable change in US$/EURO parity triggered the Turkish liquidity 
crisis in 2001 because turkey import depends on US$ while export of Turkey 
EURO (Emre, 2001). As he points out “imports of raw materials and intermediary 
inputs are carried out in US$, whereas export to the EURO zone (54% of export in 
1999, especially to Germany which is very important trade partner) are carried out 
in EURO”. Therefore, changing in this parity could affect the Turkey economy. In 
this case, the balance of foreign trade of Turkey was devastated. Moreover, this 
movement in US$/EURO parity might have resulted in deterioration of current 
account deficit. Consequently, it is true that this variation triggered the crisis. This 
clearly shows that external factors are therefore relevant the 2001 crisis. 
 
However, it has to be noted that the monetary policy makers of Turkey should have 
taken necessary measures in order to protect economy from unfavourable shock in 
this parity. Therefore, after the crisis, export and import inputs have been 
diversified to reduce unexpected variation in this parity. In this context, the Turkey 
government has developed trade relationship with different countries such as 
eastern, northern and Middle East countries. For example, the foreign trade volume 
has been increased from 6 billion $ in 1998 to 52 billion $ with countries, which 
are member of the Back Sea Economic Cooperative, so far. As a result, this 
external factor’s effects have been   eliminated. 
 
Finally, the vulnerable financial structure of Turkey economy was affected by the 
Russian economic crisis, which had been caused by the Asian crisis by reducing the 
prices of raw materials and by disturbing confidence of foreign investors to 
Russian emerging capital market (Ersan and Kenan, 1999). As a result of these 
developments Russia faced a financial crisis in 1998. Ersan and Kenan (1999) 
claim that this crisis affected Turkish firms engaged in business and exports, 
luggage trade and tourism, which is the major revenue in the Turkey economy. 
They also note that the total loss of Turkey due to the Russian crisis amount for 3 
billion dollars per year. Therefore, it can be claimed that it was the one of the most 
important external factors behind the 2001 liquidity crisis in Turkey. 
In order to understand how the Russian economic crisis affected the Turkey 
economy, some data should be analyzed. The Turkish export to Russia had gone up 
from $1442 million in 1992 to $ 2057 million in 1997. However, the fall in Russian 
income due to the crisis, the Turkish export to Russia dropped $777 million in 
1998. Hence, the Turkey economy lost $1290 million in a year (Table 1). 
Moreover, the Turkey economy’s revenue from luggage trade with Russia and the 
number of tourists in Turkey from Russia dropped sharply from $8,842 million and 
1,256 (number in thousands) in 1996 to $3,689 million and 326 (number in 
thousands) in 1998, respectively (Table 1). As a result, this crisis had raised the 
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vulnerability of the Turkey economy. Therefore, it could be possible to state that 
Turkey economy affected external factors. 
 
In contrast, in terms of the last global financial crisis (2008), the majority of the 
governments throughout the world have taken austerity measures in order to 
preserve themselves from the crisis wave. For example, the USA, the UK and other 
European countries such as Greece, have been attempting to cut spending to reduce 
the effects of the crisis (Yenigun, 2010). In this perspective, this movement affected 
the Turkey foreign trade especially rate of export, it dropped from $132 billion in 
2008 to approximately $102 billion in 2009(Table 2). The total loss of Turkey 
economy was $30 billion. However, the proportion of imports covered by exports 
rate increased from 65, 4% to 72, 5% at the same period. Consequently, it can be 
said that although the last global financial crisis was bigger than the Russian crisis, 
in terms of foreign trade, its effects on the Turkey economy was lower (Table 2). 
This clearly shows that external factors are therefore not the most relevant. 
 
 
Role of Internal Factors 
There were some external factors behind the 2001 Turkish liquidity crisis, even 
though internal factors the most relevant. In this perspective, Fatih and Guven 
(2002) has drawn attention the fact that the Turkish economy had been struggling 
the chronic inflation, which is one of the most important internal factors, for 25 
years. Therefore, the monetary policy makers had implemented many stabilisation 
attempts, some of which have failed, in order to solve this problem (Emre, 2001). It 
is echoed by Ahmet and Erinc (2002), this program “exclusively relied on a 
nominally pegged exchange rate system for dis-inflation which has been major 
concern for Turkish policy makers for many years”. In this case, before the Turkish 
liquidity crisis in 2001, Turkey initiated an extensive dis-inflation programme in 
December 1999 backed and supervised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Ahmet and Erinc, 2002). As outlined in the Turkey letter of intent (1999), this 
programme aimed at fiscal adjustment, structural reform and privatization in 
Turkey economy. This letter also included significant measures to reinforce and 
regulate both the financial environment and banking sector of Turkey. However, 
this programme had many deficiencies on the implementation. For example, it just 
focused on reducing interest rate and inflation so that policy makers forgot the 
banking sector thus, this behaviour increased the vulnerability of the banking 
sector, and lack of monetary policy the Turkish government could not complete 
privatisation, which was very important in structural reform, and so on. As a result, 
it could not have been successful to prevent the internal factors effects so they 
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triggered the crisis. Thus, this clearly shows that if the Turkish monetary policy 
makers had solved the internal problems, the crisis would not have boomed. 
 
Initially, it could be possible to argue that the Turkish monetary policy makers 
should not have taken essential measures to protect economic stabilisation before 
the crisis. However, Ahmet and Erinc (2002) claim that throughout the first year of 
the dis-inflation programme, rule of this programme’s were followed and the 
Central Bank of Turkey successfully controlled expansion of monetary base with 
its net domestic asset position within the programme limits. They also mentioned 
“the fiscal operations were in line both the revenue and expenditure targets”. 
Nevertheless, the crisis conditions emerged in does course, primarily as a result of 
the increase fragility in financial system. According to Ahmet and Erinc (2002) 
“this fragility, in turn, was generated by the uncontrolled and excessively capital 
flow with exceedingly speculative component”. In other words, this could be 
explained in this way, the Turkish economy had become more vulnerable to 
speculative capital flow because of liberalized capital account system  which had 
been applied since 1989 due to this programme’s permission to higher level of 
speculative capital inflow. Hence, this clearly shows that lack of monetary policy 
increased the economic crisis risk. 
 
Ahmet and Erinc (2002) also claim that, in the context of the Turkish dis-inflation 
programme, dept financed public deficit and rapid acceleration of private 
expenditures increased inflow of short-term foreign capital. Therefore, the ratio 
short-term foreign dept to the Central Bank’s reserves rose secularly throughout the 
programme. In this case, this ratio should have been the value of 60 percent 
because in terms of international speculation, its critical threshold is 60 percent 
(see e.g.  Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart,1998). It is obvious note that this ratio 
had never fallen below 100 percent since the liberalization system in Turkey, 1989. 
It means that the Turkish financial system had been operating consistently under 
the “danger zone” (Ahmet and Erinc, 2002). During the implementation of the dis-
inflation programme, this ratio rose to 112 percent in June 2000 to 147 percent 
December 2000 (Table 3). Thus, it can be said that the programme increased the 
financial fragility and its liquidity creating mechanism did not allow for 
stabilisation. Therefore, it could be said that internal conditions were the most 
relevant. 
 
Moreover, in the context of the Turkish banking system before the crisis, the 
banking sector’s profit based on high inflation rates and real interest rate because 
no one believed that these rates could neither be reduced nor controlled (Emre, 
Hakan and Kamuran, 2001). Therefore, they organized all working plans to gain 
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profit based on these rates. Demirguc and Huizinga (1999) concluded that in their 
analysis, the determinant of interest margins and profitability of banking sector, 
“higher inflation and real interest rates are associated with higher realized interest 
margins and profitability”. They also found that “banking sectors with higher rates 
of concentration have higher margins and earn more profit”. However, after the dis-
inflation programme, inflation rate and interest rate started to decrease so that the 
Turkish banking sector changed their position towards to government debt 
instrument portfolio. It has to be noted that the quality of the government debt 
instruments portfolio is directly related to expectation regarding dept sustainability. 
Hence, Fatih and Guven (2002) argue that this feature increased the vulnerability of 
the system to concerns about the rollover it the outstanding government debt 
instruments because they also claimed that this portfolio in commercial bank 
balance sheets was even greater than loan portfolio. Consequently, this movement 
triggered the crisis under the uncertain financial environment in Turkey. Therefore, 
this clearly shows that if the government had realized the banking sector’s this 
perilous movement timely, the crisis could have been prevented. 
 
The other crucial internal factor behind the crisis is mid-sized banks in the banking 
system. Einchengreen (1998) argues that regarding the banking sector crisis which 
triggered the 2001 financial crisis, “the problem lied with a number of mid-sized 
banks”. In addition, it ought to be noted that the Turkish government gave them 
bailout guarantee which means that when they are in the bankruptcy situation, their 
deposits and assets will be protected by the government (CB, Financial Stability 
Report, 2008). In fact, the majority of mid-sized banks were established because 
they relied on this guarantee (Fatih and Guven, 2002). According to Burnside, 
Enchenbaum and Rebelo (2001) “economic agents expect that these future deficit 
due to bailout guarantee, are going to be financed by many creation, which leads to 
a collapse of fixed exchange rate regime”. Hence, it is clear that these banks 
damaged the Turkish banking system. Therefore, having been given permission to 
establish these kinds of banks in the Turkish banking sector, and lack of controlling 
of these banks’ financial structure, led the Turkey economy into the crisis. 
 
Furthermore, The Banks Association of Turkey’s data showed that before the 2001 
crisis, Turkey have 84 banks. However, during the crisis period 37 mid-sized banks 
were bailout and the number of banks in the Turkish banking sector decreased to 47 
(BRSA, 2010). Failure of these banks brought massive amount of $ billion 
financial burden on the Turkey economy. Therefore, this circumstance led the 
Turkey economy into worse condition. However, it should be noted that after the 
crisis, Turkish banking sector has grown under the control of the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision institute which was established in the year 2000 
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(Tevfik,2010). This institute reduced the number of mid-sized banks and controlled 
the bank’s balance sheets in order to keep the sustainable growth. As a result, many 
banks have bankrupted in the USA after the global crisis. Despite this fact there is 
no bank has bankrupted. Therefore, this clearly shows that if the banking sector is 
controlled in right way, in other words, if the fragility of the banking sector is 
solved, the economy can be protected from the crisis. 
 
On the privatisation front, the Turkish monetary policy makers were planning to 
make money from privatisation under the control of IMF so as to decrease budget 
deficit and increase the investments. However, Emre (2001) has drawn attention 
the fact that “instead of the privatisation receipt target value of US$7, 5 billion only 
US$3, 5 billion was realized throughout 2000”. This development showed that the 
Turkish authority went out of the programme. Therefore, they could not meet the 
target. As a result, their finance plan was devastated. In contrast, after the crisis, the 
Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Privatisation Administration’s data indicates 
that the government has made almost $25 billion revenue from privatisation so that 
they could use this money to protect economy (Table 7). Hence, following the 
monetary policy rules is very important. In this perspective, if it is not followed, it 
could trigger the crisis. 
 
Besides, one of the most important triggering factors behind the crisis is the current 
account deficit. It reached the peak before the crisis at -9, 92 in 2000. Therefore, all 
economic predictions were damaged by this augmentation. However, it could be 
argued that the problem was not just current account deficit. The real problem was 
in how to finance it. Current account deficit was  overwhelmingly financed with 
short-term capital in that year (Figure 2). Hence, when the short-term capital float 
from the country, it could not be financed consequently the problem become 
bigger. Turkey had same situation in the crisis year. On the other hand, although in 
the year 2007 the current account deficit was higher than used to be, the Turkey 
economy was not damaged because it was financed with long-term capital and 
foreign direct investment, which are more durable than short-term capital. it stated 
in the CB bulletin (March 2009) that “long-term capital and foreign direct 
investment have significant impact in terms of the financing quality of the current 
account deficit, and they reduce the degree of vulnerability of the economy”. As a 
result, it can be said that the current account might not be a big problem, if it is 
financed in right way (Table 4). 
 
Another important internal reason in the crisis is lack of monetary policy. For 
example, monetary policy makers ruled out the seasonal factors such as common in 
finance literature the so-called “January affect” which refers to outflow of the 
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capital from a country in order for avoiding tax liability. In the case of Turkey, 
according to Emre (2001) stated that although the Central Bank of Turkey is able to 
sterilize the effects of this seasonal outflow, it operated like a  quasi-currency board 
and ruled out the possibility of unfavourable effects on the fragile finance and 
banking system structure due to such outflow. As a consequence, it is clear that 
policy makers always have to prepare themselves to these kinds of effects. 
Otherwise, financial environment could not be protected like in Turkish crisis case. 
This clearly shows that lack of monetary policy is therefore the one of the most 
relevant internal factors behind the crisis. 
 
It could be stated that political stability is one of the most significant indicators for 
financial environment in order to sustain and keep their position. In this case, on 
the 19 of February in 2001, after the National Security Council meeting, the Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit declared that there was a deep difference opinion between 
him and President A.Necdet Sezer. He also added that it was a very important 
political crisis. This declaration was not estimated in the uncertain financial 
environment. Therefore, after this announcement, Fatih and Guven (2002) stated 
that overnight interest rate skyrocketed to 4019 in two days, and the Central Bank 
lost 7, 5 billion dollars of reserve thus, the CB had to accept the collapse of 
crawling peg exchange system and the Lira would be going to freely float so that 
the dollar exchange rate jumped to 958 thousand liras from a level of 685 thousand 
liras. Consequently, the Turkey economy slid into a massive crisis. This clearly 
shows that if this political instability had not been occurred, the financial crisis 
could have been obstructed. Therefore, it was relevant internal factor behind the 
crisis. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this essay has attempted to demonstrate what were the real reasons, 
which were divided into two section; internal and external factors that have been 
already mentioned above, behind the Turkish financial crisis in 2001. The crucial 
question that demands an answer is ‘which one of them overwhelmingly triggered 
the crisis. On the one hand, it has argued that before the crisis boomed, the Turkey 
economy had been affected by some unfavourable external shocks such as, rise in 
crude oil prices, which increased the current account deficit; however, it can be 
seriously solved by employing correct finance technique that using long-term 
capital and direct investment instead of short-term capital. Therefore, it can be 
clearly seen that external factors effects on the economy can be eliminated by right 
monetary policy. On the other hand, it can be stated that there were many internal 
factors behind the crisis such as fragile finance and banking system, ruling out dis-
inflation negative effects and seasonal factors and so on. It could be advocated that 
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these factors led the turkey economy into uncertain situation and they had central 
part in the crisis because, after the crisis, they had been solved so the Turkey 
economy had become stronger. Consequently, it was not be affected by the last 
global financial crisis (2008) which soared the all unexpected external factors. It 
can be said that if an economy is strong enough, the external factors are not big 
problems. However, due to occurance of different types of crises, the limitation of 
this study is appeared. In other words, different circumstances can affect a 
country’s economy which is vulnerable.It can be recommended for future studies 
that country's specific conditions should not be forgotten during analysis. 
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Summary 
 
External and Internal Factors of the Turkish Crisis in the Year 2001. 
Analysis Proposal 
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This research has attempted to demonstrate what were the real reasons whether internal or 
external factors, behind the Turkish financial crisis in 2001. The Turkey economy had been 
affected by some unfavourable external shocks such as, rise in crude oil prices which 
increased the current account deficit. However, external factors effects on the economy can 
be eliminated by right monetary policy. On the other hand, there were many internal factors 
behind the crisis such as fragile finance and banking system, ruling out dis-inflation 
negative effects and seasonal factors and so on. It could be advocated that these factors led 
the Turkish economy into uncertain situation because, when the last global financial crisis 
was occurred in 2008, although all unexpected external factors were soared, the Turkish 
economy was less affected, because the Turkish economy has been become more durable 
by solving the internal triggering factors. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1: The Trend of Crude Oil Prices 
 
Source:http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TCMB+TR/TCMB+TR/Main+
Menu/Yayinlar/Raporlar 
 
Figure 2: The History of Current Account Deficit in Turkey 
 
Source:http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TCMB+TR/TCMB+TR/Main+
Menu/Yayinlar/Raporlar 
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Table 1:Turkish Foreign Trade, Turkish Revenues from The Luggage Goods Trade with 
Russia and The Number of Tourists in Turkey from Russia 
Turkish Foreign Trade with Russia (in million dollars) 
 
Years Exports (fob) Imports Total Balance 
1992 442 1036 1478 -594 
1993 499 1542 2041 -1043 
1994 820 1046 1866 -226 
1995 1232 2082 3314 -850 
1996 1512 1921 3433 -409 
1997 2057 2174 4231 -117 
1997 914 1018 1932 -104 
1998 777 1071 1848 -294 
 
Turkish Revenues from The Luggage Goods Trade with Russia  
(million dollars) 
 
Source:  
1) Turkish State Institute of Statistics 
(http://www.dpt.gov.tr/tptweb/ekutup98/rusya/kriz.html)  
2)Turkish State Planning Organization 
(http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/ekutup98/rusya/kriz.html)  
3) Central Bank of Turkey (http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/)  
4)Turkish State Planning Organization 
http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/ekutup98/rusya/kriz.html 
 
Table 3The Number of Tourists in Turkey from Russia 
 
 1996 1997 1998 
Countries Number in 
thousand 
 1   
% 
Number in 
thousand 
 2   
% 
Number in 
thousand 
 3   
% 
Russia 1256  4   1017  5   326  6   
Source:  
1) Turkish State Institute of Statistics 
(http://www.dpt.gov.tr/tptweb/ekutup98/rusya/kriz.html)  
2)Turkish State Planning Organization 
(http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/ekutup98/rusya/kriz.html)  
3) Central Bank of Turkey (http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/)  
4)Turkish State Planning Organization 
http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/ekutup98/rusya/kriz.html 
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Table 2:Turkish Foreign Trade by Years 
 
Foreign trade by years
 Value 000 $
      Balance of        Volume of
    Foreign Trade     Foreign Trade Proportion of
Imports covered
Value Change Value Change Value Value by Exports
Years '000 $ % '000 $ % '000 $ '000 $ %
1990 ........................................................................12 959 288 11,5 22 302 126 41,2 -9 342 838 35 261 413 58,1
1991 .........................................................................13 593 462 4,9 21 047 014 -5,6 -7 453 552 34 640 476 64,6
1992 ...............................................................14 714 629 8,2 22 871 055 8,7 -8 156 426 37 585 684 64,3
1993 ...............................................................15 345 067 4,3 29 428 370 28,7 -14 083 303 44 773 436 52,1
1994 ...............................................................18 105 872 18,0 23 270 019 -20,9 -5 164 147 41 375 891 77,8
1995 ...............................................................21 637 041 19,5 35 709 011 53,5 -14 071 970 57 346 052 60,6
1996...............................................................23 224 465 7,3 43 626 642 22,2 -20 402 178 66 851 107 53,2
1997...............................................................26 261 072 13,1 48 558 721 11,3 -22 297 649 74 819 792 54,1
1998...............................................................26 973 952 2,7 45 921 392 -5,4 -18 947 440 72 895 344 58,7
1999...............................................................26 587 225 -1,4 40 671 272 -11,4 -14 084 047 67 258 497 65,4
2000………………….27 774 906 4,5 54 502 821 34,0 -26 727 914 82 277 727 51,0
2001………………….31 334 216 12,8 41 399 083 -24,0 -10 064 867 72 733 299 75,7
2002………………….36 059 089 15,1 51 553 797 24,5 -15 494 708 87 612 886 69,9
2003.........................47 252 836 31,0 69 339 692 34,5 -22 086 856 116 592 528 68,1
2004........................63 167 153 33,7 97 539 766 40,7 -34 372 613 160 706 919 64,8
2005..........................73 476 408 16,3 116 774 151 19,7 -43 297 743 190 250 559 62,9
2006......................................................................   85 534 676 16,4    139 576 174 19,5 -54 041 498 225 110 850 61,3
2007............................107 271 750 25,4   170 062 715 21,8 -62 790 965 277 334 464 63,1
2008....................  132 027 196 23,1   201 963 574 18,8 -69 936 378   333 990 770 65,4 65,4
2009*....................   102 128 759 -22,6   140 926 023 -30,2 -38 797 264   243 054 782 72,5
Data for 2009 are provisional.
Exports Imports
 
Source: 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Start.do;jsessionid=LhvcJ28pTdhGcrW7nLd9QXmSKQMl
Gyl4GwRyV42rsSY1mtHD1Xpj!-2035832961 
 
Table 3:Turkish Current Account Balances by Years(Billion USD) 
1984 -1,4 1989 0,9 1994 2,6 1999 -0,9 2004 -14,4 
1985 -1,0 1990 -2,6 1995 -2,5 2000 -9,9 2005 -22,1 
1986 -1,5 1991 0,3 1996 -2,4 2001 3,8 2006 -32,1 
1987 -0,8 1992 -1,0 1997 -2,6 2002 -0,6 2007 -38,2 
1988 2,6 1993 -6,4 1998 2,0 2003 -7,5 2008 -41,4 
Source:http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TCMB+TR/TCMB+TR/Main+
Menu/Istatistikler/Parasal+ve+Finansal+Istatistiklr 
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Table 4: Interests Rates and Exchange Rates on February 2001 
 
Source: http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TCMB+TR/TCMB+TR/ 
Main+Menu/Istatistikler 
 
